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FRAMEWORK PAPER
CORNEL NESSELER
The dissertation consists of three papers which discuss sports economics
topics. The methodology in each paper depends on the idiosyncratic research
question. A theoretical approach for the first paper best fits to the paper’s
research question. For the second and third paper an empirical approach is
more appropriate. The results of each paper depend on the methodology we
use. After the methodological description we describe, evaluate, and discuss
the results in each paper.
The first paper (pp. 4-24), “The Impact of Government Subsidies in Profes-
sional Team Sports Leagues”, examines the e↵ects of subsidies in a profes-
sional team sports league. For this purpose, we use a game theoretic model.
We model a league with a large and a small market club. In our approach
we focus not only on competitive balance and winning percentage but also
on aggregate talent. Aggregate talent measures the total amount of talent
in a league. Additionally, we include fan preferences for aggregate talent.
Thus, fans can have di↵erent preference levels for the total amount of talent.
This is an important distinction as fans might favor competitive balance and
winning percentage over aggregate talent and vice versa.
To evaluate the e↵ect of subsidies we observe their e↵ects on player salaries,
competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare. We find that the e↵ect
of the subsidy depends on the recipient (i.e., large or small market club) and
the amount of fan demand for aggregate talent.
When a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong
preference for aggregate talent, then aggregate club profits and welfare in-
crease. Club profits increase for both clubs. Competitive balance decreases.
Team winning percentage further increases for the large market club.
In the other case, the small market club receives a subsidy. A relatively small
subsidy leads to an increase in competitive balance and player salaries for
1
the small and the large market club.
The results for both cases have important policy implications. We show that
subsidies can have positive e↵ects for all clubs in a league even though only
one club receives a subsidy. When fans from both clubs have a high pref-
erence for aggregate talent, all teams can benefit. When fans have a low
preference for aggregate talent then a subsidy shifts mainly competitive bal-
ance and winning percentage. In this case, only the club receving the subsidy
benefits.
The second paper (pp. 25-41), “Momentum in Tennis: Controlling the
Match”, examines how tennis players benefit from a psychological or physi-
ological advantage (momentum). Therefore, we empirically analyze approx-
imately 3’000 tennis matches by using a regression with robust standard
errors.
In contrast to previous work in the area of momentum, we include the actual
outcome of the second to last set. In previous research the outcome of the
second to last set was reduced to a binary variable. However, winning the
second to last set with the largest possible margin (i.e., 6 – 0) or with the
smallest possible margin (i.e., 7 – 6) makes a significant di↵erence. Addi-
tionally, we include the round of a match (e.g., whether players meet in the
first round or in the final).
Other variables we include, which have also been included in previous re-
search, are player skill set (ATP ranking), tournament (ATP or Grand Slam),
gender, and home advantage.
We find that players benefit from momentum as long as they control a match.
Players are controlling a match when they win the second to last set with a
relatively high margin. The control declines when the margin shrinks. Once
players lose control over a match, we find that they have a significantly lower
chance to win the next set than their opponent. This loss of control results
in what we define as anti-momentum. Anti-momentum means that players
have a lower chance to win the last set even though they won the second to
last set.
Our results shed new light on the concept of momentum. We show that
while several aspects of momentum for tennis player are important (e.g.,
ATP ranking), none is as important as the outcome of the second to last set.
Thus, the most important variable to determine whether a player benefits
from momentum is to observe the outcome in the second to last set.
2
The third paper (pp. 42-71), “Are Women or Men Better Team Managers?
Evidence from Professional Team Sports”, examines if sports clubs fare dif-
ferently depending on the gender of the manager. We empirically analyze
the performance of both male and female managers in the North American
basketball league for women (WNBA) and in three European soccer leagues
(viz., France, Germany, and Norway). In the North American Basketball
league we compare managers which have a similar amount of specialized ex-
perience. Specialized experience means that a manager has worked as an
employee in the same industry. Thus, in our case specialized experience
means that a manager played in the WNBA (or NBA for males). In the
European study only female managers have specialized experience. We use a
robust regression to detect di↵erences in performance between male and fe-
male managers. In the next step we apply the Blinder Oaxaca decomposition
to check if performance di↵erences depend on di↵erent pre-conditions. This
decomposition is used to analyze how and which variables e↵ect a binary
variable. In our case the binary variable is either male or female.
We find that, on average, female managers never perform worse than male
managers. In the WNBA both females and males with specialized experi-
ence perform equally well. In the European case, where female managers
have specialized experience, female managers perform equally well as their
male counterparts. Our research shows that specialized experience has no
e↵ect on performance. Additionally, we find that female managers work un-
der significantly worse pre-conditions. These results have important policy
implications for players, managers, and club o cials. We show that female
managers are in no way harmful for a company’s performance.
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THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES IN
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS LEAGUES
HELMUT M. DIETL
University of Zurich
MARKUS LANG
University of Zurich
CORNEL NESSELER
University of Zurich
This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the ef-
fect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club prof-
its, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win
percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results
show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have
a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to
competitive balance and own team winning percentage, then club
profits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small market
club is subsidized then a small subsidy increases competitive bal-
ance and player salaries of both clubs.
1. INTRODUCTION
Government subsidies are a common phenomenon in professional team sports.
These subsidies usually take the form of advantageous property deals1 , tax
loopholes2 , and low or zero stadium rents.3 As a result of these subsidies,
some clubs enjoy cost advantages over their competitors. A special case
1The European Commision states that the Spanish soccer club Real Madrid: ”appears
to have benefited from a very advantageous real property swap with the City of Madrid.”
(see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-13-1287 en.htm)
2See e.g., Barcelona CF, Athletic Club Bilbao. For them the European Commision
states that they might have received ”Possible privileges regarding corporate taxation.”
3One example for stadium rent is the Dutch soccer club Willem II (see
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-13-192 en.htm ). Clubs that might have bene-
fited by paying no or lower rent for their training facilities are FC Den Bosch and MVV
(these are also Dutch soccer clubs).
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of these cost advantages are income tax di↵erences with respect to player
salaries.
In France, there is a uniform income tax rate. As a result players in the
first French division face an income tax rate of 45% if their salary exceeds
150,000. Monaco, on the other hand, does not impose income taxes. Accord-
ingly, players from AS Monaco, who also compete in the first French division,
do not pay any income taxes.
In the US, state and city income tax rates also di↵er substantially. For exam-
ple, Florida and Texas do not impose state and city income taxes, whereas
California charges state taxes of up to 12.3%. The former coach of the Or-
lando Magic, Glenn Anton ”Doc” Rivers, tried to convince free agents of
opposing teams to join the Magic by yelling at them during games, ”We
have no state and city taxes, and it’s always 80 degrees.”
Kopkin (2012) identifies the e↵ect of changes in income tax rates on player
transfers. He finds that an increase in the marginal income tax rate for
a given team results in a decrease of the average skill of free agents who
transfer to this team. Alm, Kaempfer, Sennoga, and Batte (2012) analyze
the same e↵ect in professional baseball and show that low tax cities bene-
fit from a ”home field advantage” in the free agent market. To the best of
our knowledge, these e↵ects have never been analyzed in a game theoretical
model of a professional sports league. Our model builds on former models
which have focused on competitive balance and win percentage (see e.g., Di-
etl, Lang, Werner, 2009; Vrooman, 2008; Szymanski Kesenne, 2004). We
follow Madden (2012) by including the e↵ect of aggregate talent on demand.
Unlike Madden, however, we explicitly model fan preference for aggregate
talent while he uses aggregate talent primarily as an additional factor in the
revenue function.
Based on our game theoretical model we show how subsidies a↵ect player
salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare. The results
show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively
strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and
own team winning percentage, then club profits and welfare increase for both
clubs. If the small market club is subsidized then a small subsidy increases
competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.
Our model clearly deviates from classical gate revenue sharing models (cf.,
Szymanski Kesenne, 2004) because subsidies e↵ect competitive balance and
aggregate talent. In classical revenue sharing models aggregate talent is not
included. While in the classical gate revenue sharing model competitive bal-
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ance decreases we show several results in the opposite direction. Additionally,
several outcomes in our model result in an increasing competitive balance.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of the
model. Section 3 explains the equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 presents the
results and explains the intuition. Section 5 sums up the main arguments
and proposes options for future research.
2. MODEL SETUP
We model a two-club league in which both clubs participate in a noncoop-
erative game and independently pay a certain amount for player salaries to
maximize profits. Each club k 2 {i, j} generates its own revenues according
to a fan demand function that depends on the match quality, i.e., own team
win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent.4
We introduce the concept of exogenous assistance in the form of a subsidy.
In the Lang, Grossmann, and Theiler, 2011 model, outside actors financially
assist clubs, thereby influencing a club’s objective function. In our model,
no outside actor has the possibility of influencing a club’s objective function.
One example in our case is a regional government that has its own economic
interests in supporting a club via tax relief but that cannot directly influence
the club’s decision-making process.
The gross salaries (salary payments) of club k are denoted by xk and the
net-of-tax salaries sk the players receive at club k are given by
sk = (1  µkt)xk
with t 2 [0, 1] and µk 2 [0, 1]. We assume xk > 0. The income tax is
denoted by t and the subsidy (tax relief) that club k obtains is presented by
the parameter µk, where a higher value of µk denotes a lower subsidy. For
notational simplicity, we substitute the term (1  µkt) with ↵k and obtain
sk = (1  µkt)xk = ↵kxk
with ↵k 2 [1  t, 1]. With the new notation, a higher parameter ↵k reflects a
higher subsidy. In the extreme case, ↵k = 1 and club k does not have to pay
4H. Dietl and Lang, 2008 use a similar approach but without the inclusion of aggregate
talent. Aggregate talent is included in a di↵erent way in the models of H. M. Dietl, Lang,
and Rathke, 2009, and Madden, 2011.
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any taxes so that the gross salaries the club pays corresponds to the net-of-
tax salary the players receive, i.e., sk = xk. In contrast, if ↵k = 1  t, club k
does not receive any subsidy and has to pay the full tax so that sk = (1 t)xk.
While this setup assumes that any revenues from a subsidy are passed on to
the salary of the players, a more relaxed assumption is also plausible. By
assuming that both clubs i, j forward the same share of the subsidy to their
players we relax the general assumption that all tax revenues are forwarded.
Next, we specify the revenue function, which depends on win percentage,
competitive balance, and aggregate talent. Win percentage is most com-
monly represented by the contest-success function (CSF). We select Tullock’s
(1980) logit approach:
wk(xi, xj) =
sk
si + sj
=
↵kxk
↵ixi + ↵jxj
,
with k 2 {i, j}.5 We use the following measurement for competitive balance:
CB(xi, xj) = wi(xi, xj)wj(xi, xj) =
↵ixi↵jxj
(↵ixi + ↵jxj)2
.
If both clubs have the same winning percentage (wi = wj = 0.5), competitive
balance is 1/4. The opposite case, a league with one dominant club (wi =
1, wj = 0), has a competitive balance of 0.
Fans value not only competitive balance but also aggregate playing talent
within the league.
AT (xi, xj) = ↵ixi + ↵jxj.
Without aggregate talent, supporters are unable to distinguish between teams
in a high or low league (assuming that win percentages are the same). By
including   > 0 to measure the relative importance of aggregate talent, the
quality function of club k is
qk(xi, xj) = wk(xi, xj) + CB(xi, xj) +
1
 
AT (xi, xj).
We assume that every supporter, denoted by  , has a preference for a game’s
quality, denoted by ✓. For simplicity, we assume that these preferences are
5Note, it is not the gross salary xk but the net-of-tax salary sk that determines the
playing talent, and, in turn, the win percentage.
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uniformly distributed in [0, 1]; that is, the measure of potential fans is 1.6
The payo↵ for a supporter is described as the utility a supporter derives
from attending a game, ✓ qk, minus the cost a supporter has to pay for
it, pk. We take for granted that a consumer’s payo↵ cannot be negative,
max{✓ qk   pk, 0}. The consumer who is indi↵erent with respect to attending
a game (or, similarly, paying a television fee to watch the game) is described
by ✓  =
pk
qk
. Thus, the number of supporters who are willing to attend a
game at price pk is expressed by 1  ✓  = qk pkqk .
By assuming that each club has a market size or drawing potential given
by mk > 0, the aggregate demand function for club k is denoted by
dk(mk, pk, qk) = mk
qk   pk
qk
= mk(1  pk
qk
).
Thus, the club’s revenue function is
Rk = pk · dk(mk, pk, qk).
The optimal choice for a club to maximize earnings is to set pk =
qk
2 , which
results in the following revenue function:
Rk =
mk
4
qk =
mk
4
(wk(xi, xj) + CB(xi, xj) +
1
 
AT (xi, xj)).
Our revenue functions di↵er from the revenue functions of other papers, i.e.,
Szymanski, 2003, Vrooman (2007, 2008) because our revenue function de-
pends on consumer preferences for aggregagte talent. The revenue functions
allow us to measure social welfare consisting of club profits, consumer sur-
plus, supporter surplus, and player salaries.
Profit ⇡k for club k is given by revenues Rk minus gross salaries (salary
payments) xk
⇡k =
mk
4
(wk(xi, xj) + CB(xi, xj) +
1
 
AT (xi, xj))  xk.
Given that the maximal price consumers are willing to spend is pk = qk
and that in equilibrium, consumers have to pay a price of pk =
qk
2 , we receive
6For more detail, see H. Dietl, Lang, and Werner, 2009, and Falconieri, Palomino, and
Sa´kovics, 2004, who use a similar approach.
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the following aggregate consumer surplus (CS):
CS = CSi + CSj with CSk =
Z qk
qk
2
m
qk   pk
qk
dpk =
m
8
qk, k 2 {i, j} so that
CS =
1
8
(mqi + qj).
Net-of-tax player salary is given by sk = (1 µkt)xk = ↵kxk and aggregate
player salary by PS = si + sj. We calculate aggregate club profits in the
same way: ⇡i + ⇡j. The social planner receives (1  ↵i)xi and (1  ↵j)xj as
taxes. With all four components social welfare is7
W (xi, xj) = ⇡i + ⇡j + CS + ↵ixi + ↵jxj + (1  ↵i)xi + (1  ↵j)xj,
With ⇡i = Ri   xi social welfare reduces to
W (xi, xj) = Ri +Rj + CS.
We have thus defined all our main variables: competitive balance, aggregate
talent, club profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. In the next section
we calculate the equilibrium outcomes.
3. EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
For notational simplicity, we normalize mj = 1 and write mi = m. To
maximize profits, each club chooses the optimal salary payment x⇤k. Thus,
the clubs’ optimization problems are maxxi 0 ⇡i and maxxj 0 ⇡j with the
corresponding first-order conditions
@⇡i
@xi
=
 4 (xi↵i + xj↵j)3 +m↵i((xi↵i + xj↵j)3 + 2x2j↵2j )
 (xj↵j + xi↵i)
= 0,
@⇡j
@xj
=
↵j(xi↵i + xj↵j)3 + 2 (x2i↵
2
i↵j   2(xi↵i + xj↵j)3)
 (xj↵j + xi↵i)
= 0,
and second-order conditions8
@⇡2i
@x2i
=   3mx
2
j↵
2
i↵
2
j
2(xi↵i + xj↵j)4
< 0 and
@⇡2j
@xj2
=   3x
2
i↵
2
i↵
2
j
2(xi↵i + xj↵j)4
< 0.
7Note that (1  ↵k)xk = µktxk.
8Second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied because @⇡
2
i
@x2i
< 0 and
@⇡2j
@xj2 < 0.
9
From the first-order conditions, we derive the equilibrium salary payments
x⇤i =
↵i↵jm2 (↵j   4 )
2(3m↵i↵j (↵j   4 )  ↵j   +m↵i (↵j   3 ) m2↵2i (↵j   4 )(↵j    )
,
x⇤j =
m↵i(↵j(m↵i   4 )( (3m↵i + ↵j) m↵i↵j) +  (3↵j  +m↵i(    ↵j))
8 2(m↵i   ↵j)3 ,
with   = (m↵i↵j(m↵i 4 )(↵j 4 ))1/2. To ensure non-negative equilibrium
salary payments, we assume from now on that the fan preference for aggregate
talent is su ciently large, with   <  ⇤ = min{↵im4 , ↵j4 }.
Next, we derive the equilibrium win percentages:
w⇤i =
1
1 + ↵j(4  m↵i)
(m↵i↵j(4  m↵i)(↵j 4 ))1/2
and w⇤j =
1
1  m↵i(↵j 4 )
(m↵i↵j(m↵i 4 )(↵j 4 ))1/2
.
Club profits in equilibrium are
⇡⇤i =
m2(4↵j   +m2↵2i (6↵j  + 8 
2   3↵2j ) +m↵i↵j(2 (5↵j   12 )  3 
32 2(↵j  m↵i)2 ,
⇡⇤j =
2m↵i↵j (5m↵i + 3↵j) + 8↵j 2(↵j   3m↵i)  3m2↵2i↵2j   3m↵i↵j  + 4m↵i  
32 2(↵j  m↵i)2 .
Consumer surplus in equilibrium is given by
CS⇤i =
m(4↵j   +m2↵2i (6↵j  + 8 
2   3↵2j )
64 2(↵j  m↵i)2 +
m↵i↵j(2 (5↵j   12 )  3 )
64 2(↵j  m↵i)2 ,
CS⇤j =
2m↵i↵j (5m↵i + 3↵j) + 8↵j 2(↵j   3m↵i)
64 2(↵j  m↵i)2 +
 3m2↵2i↵2j   3m↵i↵j  + 4m↵i  
64 2(↵j  m↵i)2 .
Consequently, social welfare in equilibrium is
W ⇤ =
3m↵i↵j(3m↵i(5 +m+m2) + ↵j(9 + 5m(1 + 2m))
64 2(↵j  m↵i)2
+
8 2(m3↵2i (1 + 2m)  3m↵i↵j(3 +m+m2) + 3↵2j )  3m2↵2i↵2j (3 +m+ 2m2)
64 2(↵j  m↵i)2
+
m (9↵i↵j   3m↵i↵j   6m2↵i↵j + 12↵i  + 4↵j  + 8m↵j ))
64 2(↵j  m↵i)2 .
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In the next section we examine the e↵ect of a subsidy on the equilibrium
outcomes.9
4. EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIES ON EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
In this section we discuss the implications of our results step by step. First,
we explore the consequences of a subsidy ↵i 2 (↵j,↵⇤i ) for club i on its salary
payments.10
Proposition 1 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy
always increases the salary payments of club i, while it increases the salary
payments of club j if and only if the subsidy is not too large. Otherwise,
a subsidy for club i reduces salary payments of club j. Formally, @xi@↵i > 0
8↵i 2 (↵j, 1) and @xj@↵i > 0, ↵i 2 (↵j,↵⇤i ) with ↵⇤i =
16↵j 
m(3↵j+4 )
.
Proof. See Appendix
To explain Proposition 1, we use Figure 1, which displays subsidies on the
x-axis and salary payments on the y-axis. The dotted line denotes the large
club. The solid line denotes the small club. Panel A shows the case when
a large club receives a subsidy. Panel B shows the case when a small club
receives a subsidy.
A club’s profit depends on its win percentage, competitive balance, and
aggregate talent. When a club receives a subsidy, it will always invest it. If
the club, which does not receive a subsidy, is small, it mainly benefits from
aggregate talent. As competitive balance decreases the small club cannot
profit from it. If the club, which does not receive a subsidy, is large, it can
benefit from both aggregate talent and competitive balance.
On the left side of Figure 1, both clubs invest in salary until the subsidy
reaches a limit. Once the subsidy reaches a limit only the large club invests
in salary. The small club decreases investment in salary.
As shown on the right side of Figure 1, the salary investment of the large
club, which does not receive the subsidy, first increase and then decrease.
The salary investment for the small club increases. In both cases (left and
9A benchmark case (when the tax subsidy is symmetric) does not yield di↵erent results
compared with no subsidies.
10An equivalent proposition can be derived if club j receives the tax break.
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Figure 1 - Salary Payments
Panel A: Subsidy for large club Panel B: Subsidy for small club
——— Small club - - - - - Large club
right side in Figure 1) the salary payments for the subsidy receiving club
always increase.
The following proposition analyzes the e↵ect of subsidies on win percent-
age.
Proposition 2 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy
always increases the win percentage of club i and decreases the win percentage
of club j. Formally, @wi@↵i > 0 and f
@wj
@↵i
< 0 8↵i 2 (↵j, 1).
Proof. See Appendix
The proposition shows that a higher subsidy has an unambiguous e↵ect on
win percentages. Thus, even if club j increases salary payments as a result of
a subsidy lower than the subsidy of club i, this increase is overcompensated
for by an increase in the salary payments of club i.
Next, we examine the e↵ect of subsidies on competitive balance.
Proposition 3 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. If club i is the large club,
increasing the subsidy always decreases competitive balance. If club i is the
small club, increasing the subsidy increases competitive balance if and only
if the subsidy is not too large. Otherwise, a subsidy for the small club de-
12
creases competitive balance. Formally, @CB@↵i < 0 8↵i 2 (↵j, 1) for m > 1 and
@CB
@↵i
> 0, ↵i 2 (↵j,↵CBi ) with ↵CBi = ↵jm for m < 1.
Proof. See Appendix
To explain Proposition 3, we use Figure 2, which displays competitive bal-
ance.
Figure 2 - Competitive Balance
Panel A: Subsidy for large club Panel B: Subsidy for small club
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The e↵ect of a subsidy on competitive balance depends on which club
receives the subsidy. If one club dominates the league, competitive balance
is comparably low. When a (small or large) club benefits from a subsidy,
the club’s salary payments will increase as the club has more funds available.
If the large club receives a subsidy, competitive balance will decrease as
the large club’s salary payments further increase in relation to the salary
payment of the small club. The opposite holds true for the small club:
An increasing subsidy leads to higher salary payments of the small club,
resulting in a more balanced league until a maximum. After the maximum,
competitive balance decreases. Figure 2 shows this case on the right-hand
side. Additionally, a relatively high preference for aggregate talent leads to
lower (higher) competitive balance if the large (small) market club receives
a subsidy.
We derive the following numerical result for the e↵ect of a subsidy on
aggregate talent:
Result 1 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy always
increases aggregate talent in the league if and only if the subsidy is not too
large. Otherwise, a subsidy for club i reduces aggregate talent. Formally,
@AT
@↵i
> 0, ↵i 2 (↵j,↵ATi ).
Proof. See Appendix.
If club i receives a subsidy, it will increase its salary payments. If the sub-
sidy does not exceed a certain threshold (see previous result), club j will
have positive salary payments as well. Club j also benefits from the subsidy
through the increase in aggregate talent. However, if the subsidy is too large,
club j will considerably decrease its salary payments. The additional salary
payments of club i will then be lower than the decrease in salary payments of
club j. Therefore, aggregate talent decreases. In the next result, we analyze
how a subsidy a↵ects club profits.
Result 2 Suppose club i receives a subsidy. Increasing the subsidy increases
the profits of club i if and only if the subsidy is not too large. The op-
posite is true for club j: increasing the subsidy for club i increases the
profits of club j if and only if the subsidy is su ciently large. Formally,
@⇡i
@↵i
> 0, ↵i 2 (↵j,↵⇡i ) and @⇡j@↵i > 0, ↵i 2 (↵⇡j , 1).
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Proof. See Appendix.
To explain Result 2, we use Figure 3, which displays subsidies on the x-
axis and club profits on the y-axis. The dotted line denotes the large club.
The solid line denotes the small club. Panel A shows the case when a large
club receives a subsidy. Panel B shows the case when a small club receives a
subsidy.
Figure 3 - Club Profits
Panel A: Subsidy for large club Panel B: Subsidy for small club
——— Small club - - - - - Large club
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In panel A we see the case when the large club receives a subsidy leading
to an increase in salary payments. Accordingly, this increase leads to a more
unbalanced league (e↵ect on competitive balance). Nevertheless, the small
club benefits from the increase of salary payments because of an increase in
aggregate talent.
In panel B we see the case when the small club receives a subsidy. The
subsidy will lead to an increase in salary payments. A small subsidy leads to
an increase in competitive balance while a large subsidy leads to a decrease
in competitive balance. Aggregate talent increases for both a large and small
subsidy and almost always has a positive e↵ect on revenues. The small club’s
increase in salary payments is smaller than the decrease in the large club’s
salary payments. We see in panel B that a very large subsidy decreases the
profit of the small club (see Appendix for proof).
Next, we examine the e↵ect of subsidies on social welfare. We derive the
following numerical finding:
Result 3 Suppose club i receives a subsidy.
(a) If supporters have a high preference for aggregate talent, increasing the
subsidy always increases social welfare (see left panel of Figure 4), i.e., @W@↵i >
0 8↵i 2 (↵j, 1) for   <  ⇤.
(b) If supporters have a low preference for aggregate talent, increasing the
subsidy increases social welfare if and only if the subsidy is not too large,
i.e., @W@↵i > 0, ↵i 2 (↵j,↵Wi ) for   >  ⇤.
Proof. See Appendix.
To explain Result 3, we use Figure 4, which displays subsidies on the x-axis
and social welfare on the y-axis. Panel A shows the case when supporters
have a high preference for aggregate talent (thus 14     12). Panel B shows
the case when supporters’ preference for aggregate talent is comparatively
small (i.e., 14 <  ).
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Figure 4 - Social Welfare
Panel A: High preference for talent Panel B: Low preference for talent
Panel A shows that aggregate talent (almost) always increases through
higher subsidy (kink in aggregate talent seems not to have an e↵ect, see Fig-
ure 5 in the Appendix). If preference for aggregate talent is su ciently high,
then this e↵ect dominates all other e↵ects. Panel B shows that the social
planner must be more careful when setting the subsidy if supporters have
a low preference for aggregate talent. This means that competitive balance
is more important for the generation of revenues. In this case, social wel-
fare first increases as the subsidy increases until a maximum level is reached.
Increasing the subsidy beyond this optimum level leads to a reduction in
social welfare. To clarify the results from the previous proofs all e↵ects are
summarized in table 1.
Table 1 - Results overview
Subsidy for
large-market, e↵ect on small-market, e↵ect on
large-market small-market large-market small-market
Salary payments + ambiguous ambiguous +
Win percentage + - - +
Competitive Balance - ambiguous
Aggregate talent ambiguous ambiguous
Club profits + ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous
Social welfare ambiguous ambiguous
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Four parts of our model are especially interesting for policy makers: com-
petitive balance, aggregate talent, club profit, and social welfare.
We show that competitive balance significantly changes when one club
receives a subsidy. When a large-market club receives a subsidy, competitive
balance decreases. When a small-market club receives a subsidy, competitive
balance first increases but decreases when the subsidy is too large. Thus,
when a policy maker wants to set the socially optimal competitive balance,
he has to limit the amount of the subsidy that a small market club receives.
Managing the amount of a subsidy is an e↵ective policy instrument to
influence aggregate talent in a league. Increasing the amount of the subsidy
increases aggregate talent until a maximum is reached. Increasing the subsidy
above this talent-maximizing level decreases aggregate talent in the league.
Thus, it is important for the policy maker to find the optimal amount of the
subsidy to maximize aggregate talent in a league.
Club profit depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggre-
gate talent. We describe for policy makers two situations regarding club
profits. One scenario is when fans have a low preference for aggregate tal-
ent. Then, aggregate club profit increases only when competitive balance
increases. This means that the small market club should be subsidized. The
second scenario is when fans have a high preference for aggregate talent.
Then, aggregate club profit increases only if the large club receives a sub-
sidy. Thus, it is important for a policy maker to identify whether fans have
a high or low preference for aggregate talent.
Aggregate club profits increase when the large-market club receives the
subsidy and fans have a low preference for aggregate talent. When the small
market club receives the subsidy, aggregate club profits decrease. When fans
have a high preference for aggregate talent then a subsidy for the large-market
club increases aggregate profit. However, a subsidy for the small-market club
first increases aggregate profit but when the subsidy is too large, aggregate
profit decreases.
We assume that a policy maker is mainly interested to increase win per-
centage and tax revenues in the decision making process. A subsidy for a
large-market share club always decreases competitive balance while a sub-
sidy for a small-market share club has ambiguous e↵ects. The subsidy for the
small-market club results in higher salary payments which ultimately e↵ect
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the win percentage of both clubs. When a maximum is reached (i.e., a bal-
anced league), further increasing the subsidy decreases competitive balance.
Our model provides essential policy implications regarding social welfare.
While common intuition says that a subsidy is only beneficial for the subsidy
receiving club, our model shows that a di↵erent interpretation is appropri-
ate. When supporters from both clubs have a high preference for aggregate
talent, both clubs can benefit in terms of profit. However, when supporters
have a low preference for aggregate talent, social welfare depends mainly on
competitive balance and win percentage. Thus, when a subsidy results in a
more unbalanced league, social welfare decreases.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article is to develop a game-theoretic model that analyzes
how subsidies influence a professional team sports league. In addition to
win percentage and competitive balance, the model includes fan preference
for aggregate talent. The paper examines how subsidies influence salary
payments, competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare.
Future research can weigh competitive balance, win percentage, and ag-
gregate talent di↵erently. Additionally a similar setting in a league where
clubs are win or utility maximizers can yield interesting results.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
To proof the claim in Proposition 1, we proceed as follows. First, we show
that the subsidy always increases the salary payments of club i if this club
receives a subsidy, i.e., @x
⇤
i
@↵⇤i
> 0 8↵i > ↵j. We compute
@x⇤i
@↵i
= 0, ↵ = {↵1,↵2} with
↵i1 =  m(↵j   2 ) + (m(↵j   4 )(↵j    ))
1/2
m2
↵i2 =
 m(↵j   2 ) + (m(↵j   4 )(↵j    ))1/2
m2
We have ↵i < 0 and ↵j > 1. Moreover,
@x⇤i
@↵i
> 0 , ↵ 2 (↵i,↵j). Thus, we
conclude that @x
⇤
i
@↵⇤i
> 0 8↵i 2 (↵j, 1), which proves the claim.
Second, we show that subsidy for club i increases the salary payments of
club j if and only if the subsidy is not too large, i.e.,
@x⇤j
@↵i
> 0 , ↵i < ↵⇤i =
16↵j 
m(3↵j+4 )
. We compute
@x⇤j
@↵i
= 0, ↵ = ↵⇤i =
16↵j 
m(3↵j + 4 )
.
Moreover, we derive lim↵i!0
@x⇤j
@↵i
= m2↵j > 0 and thus
@x⇤j
@↵i
> 0 , ↵i < ↵⇤i ,
which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2
Competitive balance is defined as
CB(xi, xj) = wi(xi, xj)wj(xi, xj) =
↵ixi↵jxj
(↵ixi + ↵jxj)2
.
so that competitive balance in an equilibrium is
CB⇤ =
1
(1  ( m↵i(↵j 4 )p
m↵i↵j(m↵j 4 )(↵j 4 )
)(1 + ( ↵j(4  m↵i)p
m↵i↵j(m↵i 4 )(↵j 4 )
)
.
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Recall that large values of CB characterize a more balanced league. The most
balanced league - a league with two equally strong clubs - has a maximum
value of 0.25.
Next, we compute
@CB⇤
@↵⇤i
> 0, ↵i < ↵CBi =
↵j
m
.
Note that ↵CBi < ↵j for m > 1 and ↵
CB
i > ↵j for m < 1.
(a) Suppose that club i is the large club with m > 1 so that ↵CBi < ↵j.
Given that club i receives the subsidy, it holds ↵i > ↵j and thus ↵i > ↵CBi .
We conclude that @CB
⇤
@↵⇤i
< 0 8↵i 2 (↵j, 1), i.e., competitive balance in the
league decreases.
(b) Suppose that club i is the small club with m < 1 so that ↵CBi > ↵j.
Given that club i receives the subsidy, it holds ↵i > ↵j and thus by increasing
the subsidy the league becomes more balanced for all ↵i 2 (↵j,↵CBi ) and less
balanced for all ↵i 2 (↵CBi , 1). Formally, @CB@↵i > 0 if ↵i < ↵CBi and @CB@↵i < 0
if ↵i > ↵CBi . This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
To show that a subsidy for club i always increase the win percentage of
club i and decreases the win percentage of club j, we proceed as follows. We
derive
@w⇤i
@↵i
=
2↵j  
↵i ( m↵i↵j + 4↵j  +  )2
,
@w⇤j
@↵i
=   2m
2↵i↵j (↵j   4 )2
  ( m↵i(↵j   4 ) +  )2
,
with   =
p
m↵i↵j(m↵i   4 )(↵j   4 ).So that m↵i↵j(m↵i 4)(↵j 4) > 0.
It is straightforward to show that @w
⇤
i
@↵i
> 0 and
@w⇤j
@↵i
< 0 8↵i 2 (↵j, 1).
Proof of Result 1
To prove the claim of Result 1, we have to rely on numerical simulations.
We set m = 0.5;↵j = 0.01;   = 0.5. Solving the maximization problem
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max↵i2(↵j ,1)(x
⇤
i + x
⇤
j) yields ↵
AT
i = 0.038 and thus
@x⇤i+x
⇤
j
@↵i
> 0 , ↵i 2
(↵j,↵ATi ). Thus, a higher subsidy for club i always increases aggregate talent
in the league if and only if the subsidy is not too large. This completes the
proof of Result 1.
To explain Proof of Result 1, we use Figure 5 that displays subsidies on
the x-axis and aggregate talent on the y-axis.
Figure 5 - Aggregate Talent
Proof of Result 2
To prove the claim of Result 2, we have to rely on numerical simulations
again. We set m = 0.5;↵j = 0.01;   = 0.5: (i) Solving the maximization
problem max↵i2(↵j ,1) ⇡
⇤
i yields ↵
⇡
i = 0.038 and thus
@⇡i
@↵i
> 0, ↵i 2 (↵j,↵⇡i ).
(ii) Solving the minimization problem min ⇡⇤j yields ↵
⇡
j = 0.02 and thus
@⇡j
@↵i
> 0 , ↵i 2 (↵⇡j , 1). Thus, part (i) shows that a higher subsidy for club
i always increases the profits of club i if and only if the subsidy is not too
large. Part (ii) shows that a higher subsidy for club i increases the profits of
the other club j if and only if the subsidy is su ciently large,
Proof of Result 3
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To prove the claims of Result 3, we have to rely on numerical simulations
again. We set m = 0.5;↵j = 0.01;   = 0.5. The maximization problem
max↵i2(↵j ,1)W
⇤ has no interior solution and thus @W@↵i > 0 8↵i 2 (↵j, 1) for
  <  ⇤. Thus, increasing the subsidy always increases social welfare if sup-
porters have a high preference for aggregate talent.
Second, we setm = 0.5;↵j = 0.01;   = 2. Solving the maximization prob-
lem max↵i2(↵j ,1)W
⇤ yields ↵Wi = 0.015 and thus
@W
@↵i
> 0 , ↵i 2 (↵j,↵Wi )
for   >  ⇤. Thus, if supporters have a low preference for aggregate talent,
increasing the subsidy increases social welfare if and only if the subsidy is
not too large.
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MOMENTUM IN TENNIS: CONTROLLING THE
MATCH
HELMUT M. DIETL
University of Zurich
CORNEL NESSELER
University of Zurich
Although many studies examine if players in sports and espe-
cially in tennis benefit from a psychological or physiological boost
(momentum) none examine whether the set score or tournament
rounds are important determinants when assessing momentum.
We empirically investigate when professional female and male ten-
nis players benefit from momentum. In contrast to previous work,
we find players benefit from momentum as long as they control a
match. Once players lose control over a match, they have a signifi-
cantly lower chance to win the next set than their opponent. This
loss of control results in what we call anti-momentum.
1. INTRODUCTION
The physical concept of momentum is defined as mass times velocity. Mo-
mentum is not only interesting for physicists but also for researchers in areas
such as, finance, management, psychology, and economics.
In sports psychology, researches examine momentum because they want
to know if a player outperforms at one point in a match. If momentum is
tangible then players, coaches, and managers have a genuine advantage to
exploit. Benefiting from momentum could give a player the final component
to win a decisive match. Additionally, bettors can use knowledge about
momentum to gain from favorable bets. Hence, betting companies have a
similar interest in momentum to avoid unfavorable odds. Momentum is also
important for tournament organizers. In order to structure a tournament
which maximizes revenue and/or excitement, tournament organizers have an
interest to set matches to maximize fan interest.
In this paper, we empirically investigate when professional female and
male tennis players benefit from momentum.
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Momentum means that a player benefits from a psychological and/or
physiological boost. A psychological boost is a positive change in cogni-
tion. Cognition includes changes in self-e cacy, motivation, and attention.
A physiological boost is a positive change in behavior. Behavior includes
activity level, pace, posture, or frequency. Our definition is in line with pre-
vious definitions of momentum in sports (see the multidimensional model of
momentum by Taylor & Demick, 1994). Therefore, we use the concept of
momentum, which includes both psychological and physiological e↵ects.
Psychologists use momentum to describe a competitive situation between
two individuals (psychological momentum) (Iso-Ahola and Mobily, 1980). In
such a competitive situation, one person uses psychological warfare to im-
prove his own situation. Psychological momentum is the result of successful
psychological warfare. Iso-Ahola and Mobily (1980, p. 391) describe psycho-
logical momentum: ” . . . it increases the person’s perceived probability of
success by modifying his and the opponent’s perceptions and impressions of
one another.” This definition fits perfectly to a sports environment. In sports
competition between individuals or teams is essential. One of the first re-
search papers in psychological momentum by Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky
(1985) received widespread attention. The authors examine the so called ”hot
hand” for basketball players. They define a hot hand as the ”performance of
a [basketball] player during a particular period [which] is significantly bet-
ter than expected on the basis of the player’s overall record.” (Gilovich et
al., 1985, p. 295-296) This means that a player who is significantly better
than expected based on his overall record benefits from psychological mo-
mentum. In the context of basketball, Gilovich et al. define momentum by
the shooting accuracy of a player. They examine shooting records of the
Philadelphia 76ers, free-throw records of the Boston Celtics, and shooting
records of varsity players from Cornell University. They empirically exam-
ine if a high shooting accuracy is stable throughout a game. They conclude
that basketball players do not increase their probability to hit with every
consecutive shot. Thus, a hot hand, or momentum, does not exist.
Their results initiated widespread discussion among researchers. Wardrop
(1995) criticized Gilovich et al.’s research methods. He asserts that Gilovich
et al.’s results su↵er from the Simpson paradox, which states that if a trend
appears in di↵erent data groups the trend can disappear when the groups are
combined. Wardrop claims that Gilovich et al. incorrectly combine groups
in their analysis, therefore their data analysis yields incorrect results. Burns
(2001) argues, that Gilovich et al. need the performance data of every team
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player to test for the improved performance of an individual. Gilovich et al.
however, observe only individual performance. Bar-Eli, Avugos, and Raab
(2006) examine how research on the hot hand has evolved and what results
it provides. Aggregating the research on the hot hand they find no clear
indicator of its existence. In a recent paper by Csapo, Avugos, Raab, and
Bar-Eli (2015) the authors examine that players face increased competition
when they outperform. Thus, in order to measure momentum, researchers
should correct for the increased amount of competition. These papers show
that in team sports and especially in basketball, the existence of psycholog-
ical momentum is widely disputed. In contrast to team sports, individual
sports (e.g. tennis and racquetball), provide a competitive situation where
momentum is more easily visible. In these sports, opponents directly influ-
ence each other. Thus, no intermediates (e.g. other team members) bias the
results. Tennis is a good individual sport to study because most matches are
played one-on-one procedure. This one-on-one situation is especially inter-
esting for research in sports momentum because research in team sports is
influenced by several opponents and members from the own team.
In tennis, momentum is empirically examined by observing if the player
who won the second to last set has a significant advantage in the last set.
In a best-of-three set match this means that both players have won one set.
Researchers then observe who wins the last set. This concept is similar to
the concept of comeback.
Clearly, the hot hand in basketball is not the same as momentum in tennis.
However, both concepts rely on the notion that players have a psychological
or physiological advantage at one point in a match.
Several authors have already examined momentum in tennis. Silva, Hardy,
and Crace (1986) observe intercollegiate tennis. They do not find evidence
for psychological momentum for best-of-three set matches. Thus, Silva et al.
observe if the player who was down one set benefits from a comeback. Wein-
berg and Jackson (1989) examine a vast dataset of professional and amateur
tennis players. They observe the comeback behavior of men and women after
losing the first of three sets. They find that men are more likely to win a
”comeback game” than women. Burke, Edwards, Weigand, and Weinberg
(1997) ask tennis players to assess when they observe momentum. They find
that tennis players disagree when a player benefits from momentum. Malueg
and Yates (2010) use betting odds to control for a player’s skill set when
examining best-of-three set matches. They find that the e↵ort invested in
the first set is an important indicator to forecast which player wins the third
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set.
Our analysis di↵ers in two ways from previous work in the area of mo-
mentum.
Our first di↵erence is that we examine the set score. We analyze whether
the set score has an e↵ect on momentum. Earlier studies (cf., Silva et al.,
1986; Richardson, Adler, & Hankes, 1988; Weinberg & Jackson, 1989) ana-
lyze only whether a player wins or loses (i.e. win=1, lose=0) a set. Hence-
forth, this method is called the binary approach. A drawback to using the
binary approach, is that it does not distinguish if a player wins a set 6 - 0 or
7 - 6. Reducing the outcome of a decisive set to a binary variable does not
exploit all relevant information within the data, therefore we include the set
score in our data analysis.
Our second point of departure is that we check if momentum depends
on the rounds in a tournament. We want to analyze whether momentum
increases or decreases for a player depending on the round he plays. The
intuition is that players might perform di↵erently in a final round compared
to a first round; we might observe di↵erent momentum levels. We find that
momentum does not depend on the round; no di↵erence exists between a
final match or a first round match.
In contrast to earlier studies, our results show that momentum depends
on the set score. We find that winning the second to last set with a high
margin significantly increases the chances to win the last set. On the other
hand, if a player barely wins the second to last set he is likely to lose the
last set and, therefore, the entire match. We call this phenomenon anti-
momentum. Anti-momentum is the result of a perceived loss of control. A
player who barely won the second to last set, after being ahead in the match,
feels that he is losing control of the match. Whereas a player who easily
won the second to last set after being behind in the match feels that he
has (re-) gained control of the match. Our paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 gives a general explanation of tennis rules. Section 3 presents our
data. Section 4 evaluates the data and Section 5 is a brief conclusion of our
findings.
2. TENNIS RULES
Tennis is played in a one on one game (singles) or in a two on two game
(doubles). There are tournaments for men’s singles, men’s doubles, women’s
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singles, women’s doubles, and mixed doubles.
Tennis is structured in this way: points form a game, games form a set,
and sets form a match. A game is not the same as a match. A player wins a
game if he wins at least four points and two more than his opponent. A set
is complete if one player wins at least six games and wins two more games
than his opponent. In some Grand Slam tournaments a player has to win two
more games than his opponent to win the last and/or decisive set. However,
in the second to last set a tie break is played. When the score is 6 - 6 a set
is decided by a tie break. The outcome of the set is won by the player who
has scored at least seven points and two more points than his opponent.
If one player has won five games, then the opponent needs at least seven
games to win the set. Matches are played in best-of-three sets or best-of-
five sets mode. Women always play best-of-three set matches, men also play
best-of-five set matches. The player who wins two (respectively three) sets
wins the match.
Tennis tournaments give di↵erent amounts of points. Winning the final in
the highest ranked tournament gives 2,000 points (Grand Slam), 1,500 points
in the second highest ranked tournament (ATP World Tour Final), and 1,000
points in the third highest ranked tournament (ATP 1,000 Tournaments).
Players who do not win a tournament receive a share of the points based on
their success in the respective tournament.1
A player is ranked based on the points he gathers in all ATP or Grand
Slam tournaments in the previous twelve months. The ranking ” . . .
is the ATP’s historical objective merit-based method used for determining
entry and seeding in all tournaments for both singles and doubles, except as
modified for the Barclays ATP World Tour Finals.” (Association of Tennis
Professionals, 2015)
3. METHOD
Data
We use data for all Grand Slam tournaments beginning with 1985 for men and
2003 for women. This is due to the availability of complete data. Otherwise
we would have included the same time frame for both men and women. Our
analysis includes the Australian Open, Roland Garros, US Open, and Wim-
bledon. Table 1 gives an overview of all variables. We include only matches
1For example in a Grand Slam tournament, the runner up receives 1,200 points, a
semi-finalist 720 points and so on.
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played until the last point (we do not include matches where a player resigns).
If a male player needs three or four sets to win (respectively, a female player
needs two sets to win), the respective match is omitted from our dataset
because we cannot determine a certain set or outcome in these matches to
measure momentum. This is only possible for best-of-five-set matches for
men and best-of-three-set matches for women. Due to this process a large
part of the matches are omitted (we keep approximately 4,200 matches from
a total of approximately 19,000 matches.).
We include the winner and the loser of a match. Because the data provides
the nationality of both players, we add a variable to control how players
benefit from a home advantage. Therefore, we di↵erentiate between players
from Australia, France, United Kingdom, and USA the venues for the Grand
Slam tournaments. Similar approaches are applied by Koning (2011) and
Krumer, Rosenboim, and Shapir (2014).
Additionally, we add the number of sets a player played in the previous
match in the same tournament. For a Grand Slam tournament a previous
match has either three, four, or five sets for men and two or three sets for
women. The intuition is that a player is tired after playing five sets in the
previous round. If a player has not played in the previous match (e.g., in the
first round) we categorize the player as not tired. This means a player has a
”0” in all previous match categories.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Variable Min. Max. N
Year 1985 2013 29
Log rank di↵erence -5.937 4.863 4,283
Set outcome: 6 - 0 0 1 124
Set outcome: 6 - 1 0 1 420
Set outcome: 6 - 2 0 1 619
Set outcome: 6 - 3 0 1 1,024
Set outcome: 6 - 4 0 1 1,009
Set outcome: 6 - 5 0 1 461
Set outcome: 7 - 6 0 1 709
Male - 3 sets previous match 0 1 638
Male - 4 sets previous match 0 1 442
Male - 5 sets previous match 0 1 259
Female - 2 sets previous match 0 1 259
Female - 3 sets previous match 0 1 269
Female 0 1 1,644
Male 0 1 2,722
Home advantage 0 1 417
Roland Garros 0 1 1,093
US Open 0 1 1,057
Wimbledon 0 1 1,136
Australian Open 0 1 1,080
Round 1 0 1 2,233
Round 2 0 1 1,063
Round 3 0 1 529
Round 4 0 1 287
Quarterfinal 0 1 142
Semifinal 0 1 80
Final 0 1 32
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We distinguish between the rounds. A Grand Slam tournament has seven
stages: 1st round, 2nd round, 3rd round, 4th round, quarterfinal, semifinal,
and final. The e↵ort level between rounds could vary because players receive
a higher compensation the further they advance in a tournament. Players
could invest more e↵ort for higher paying tournaments, however, for all tour-
naments in our data set the players receive the same number of points.
Table 2: Summary statistics.
Set score 6 - 0 6 - 1 6 - 2 6 - 3 6 - 4 6 - 5 7 - 6 N
Round 1 .687 .650 .582 .530 .510 .508 .479 2,233
Round 2 .655 .623 .549 .586 .457 .627 .465 1,063
Round 3 .786 .55 .707 .583 .481 .673 .469 539
Round 4 .5 .423 .547 .562 .603 .558 .471 287
Quarterfinal .833 .714 .455 .526 142 .471 .461 142
Semifinal 1 .625 .615 .611 .461 .7 .529 80
Final .75 0 .384 .75 0 .4 32
Table 2 provides a concise overview of this data. The table shows the
score of the second to last set in every round. For example 68.7% of all
players won the match in the first round when the won the second to last set
6-0.
Additionally, the tournament type yields information about the playing
surface. The surface in Wimbledon is grass; at the French Open clay; and at
the Australian and US Open hard. It is possible that the di↵erent surface
types influence the results of our analysis. For a more advanced discus-
sion about the impact of the surface in tennis see for example Gilsdorf and
Sukhatme(2008) or del Corral (2009). We add tournament type as a fixed
e↵ects component in the analysis.
We use the points a player has received immediately before the tourna-
ment starts. We generate a variable that measures the di↵erent amassed
points of the players who face each other. Tennis players are ranked based
on the amount of points they gathered in the previous twelve months (as
explained in the previous section). We use the log of the rank of the winner
of a match minus the log of the rank of the runner-up (cf., Koning, 2001).
The di↵erence in points controls for the players skill sets.
All variables, except for the log of ranking and the set outcome, are
dummy variables.
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4. DATA ANALYSIS - CLASSICAL BINARY APPROACH
Table 3 shows the results when using the binary approach. The dependent
variable is ”1” if a player won the last set, and ”0” if the player lost the last
set. Throughout this paper we use the same dependent variable. We include
all control variables mentioned in the previous section. This approach, except
for the introduction of the control variables, is similar to the approach used
by Silva et al. (1986), Richardson et al. (1988) and Weinberg and Jackson
(1989). In the binary approach a player either wins or loses the second to
last set. The set outcome is omitted when using the binary approach. That
means a 6 - 0 or a 7 - 6 are both a ”1” for the winner and ”0” for the runner-
up. By using this approach a significant amount of data is lost. Because the
dependent variable is binary, one can also use a probit model; however, the
additional value of the probit model in this context is not clear. For a more
detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a probit model
see Angrist (2001) or Beck (2011). We performed the same analysis with a
probit regression and did not receive statistically significant di↵erent results.
We use ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. Round 1 and
Round 2 are omitted in every regression because of collinearity issues with
Round 3. This means, that the results from round 1, round 2, and round
3 are too similar to include all in our analysis. Accordingly, we omit both
round 1 and round 2.
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Table 3: Binary approach.
Binary set score
Round 3 0.0299
(0.0265)
Round 4 0.00102
(0.0335)
Quarterfinal -0.0247
(0.0450)
Semifinal 0.0428
(0.0580)
Final -0.119
(0.0910)
Ranking -0.00106
(0.00526)
3 sets previous match male 0.0185
(0.0264)
4 sets previous match male 0.0104
(0.0295)
5 sets previous match male 0.0130
(0.0356)
2 sets previous match female -0.0228
(0.0369)
3 sets previous match female -0.0170
(0.0304)
Female -0.00919
(0.0221)
Home advantage -0.0224
(0.0267)
FE Tournament Y
Constant 0.542***
(0.0194)
Observations 4,268
R-squared 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 3 shows that players have a 54.2% chance to win the last set when they
win the second to last set (assuming that all variables are ”0”). Rounds,
home advantage, gender di↵erence, and previous matches for females have
no statistically significant e↵ect on the outcome in both Table 3 and 3.
DATA ANALYSIS - SET SCORE APPROACH
In Table 4 we analyze the data from a di↵erent perspective. To examine the
set score of a match we divide every second to last set into its outcome. The
dependent variable, set score, shows the results of this approach. Again the
variable is binary ”1” for win and ”0” for runner-up.
Table 3 and Table 4 show three main results. First we see almost no di↵erence
between the rounds. No single round yields a stable statistically significant
advantage for a player. For example, on the one hand players have a signif-
icant advantage when they win the second to last set 6 - 2 in round 3, on
the other hand players have a significant disadvantage when they win the
second to last set 7 - 5 in the final. In addition to these seemingly random
results in each round, we do not see any pattern between rounds. Therefore,
we conclude that players do not behave di↵erently from round to round.
The second result concerns all set scores except the set score 7 - 6. Figure
1 shows the results from table II. The y-axis displays the chance to win the
last set, the x-axis displays the set scores. All set scores, except the set score
7 - 6, yield a higher chance to win the last set. Players have a significant
advantage of up to 60% to win the last set after winning the previous set.
However, our last result concerns the set score 7 - 6 (i.e. a player wins
through a tie break). We see, that if a player won the second to last set in
tie break, he faces anti-momentum in the last set. A player only has a 45.8%
chance to win the last set when he won the second to last set in tie break.
Anti-momentum then means that a player has a lower chance to win the last
set even though he won the second to last set. This result is visible in Figure
1. The set score 7 - 6 is a clear outlier in both cases.
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Table 4: Set score approach.
Set score 6 - 0 6 - 1 6 - 2 6 - 3 6 - 4 7 - 5 7 - 6
Round 3 0.157 -0.0835 0.147* 0.000724 0.0320 0.0420 -0.00248
(0.173) (0.0823) (0.0661) (0.0564) (0.0553) (0.0837) (0.0668)
Round 4 -0.0607 -0.190 0.00598 -0.00736 0.135 -0.0557 0.00184
(0.194) (0.115) (0.0874) (0.0706) (0.0729) (0.0972) (0.0798)
Quarterfinal 0.201 0.0533 0.000514 -0.133 0.0709 -0.173 -0.0240
(0.165) (0.189) (0.141) (0.0934) (0.0900) (0.133) (0.107)
Semifinal 0.499* -0.00781 0.149 0.0116 -0.0205 0.121 0.0372
(0.206) (0.179) (0.145) (0.125) (0.142) (0.169) (0.126)
Final 0.121 -0.514*** -0.167 0.348 -0.662*** -0.118
(0.234) (0.0865) (0.147) (0.218) (0.0663) (0.194)
Ranking -0.102*** -0.00471 -0.0409** 0.00470 -0.00581 0.0121 0.0445***
(0.0260) (0.0180) (0.0133) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0159) (0.0128)
3 sets previous match male 0.216 0.0288 -0.00183 0.0744 -0.0407 -0.0106 0.00705
(0.126) (0.0851) (0.0733) (0.0544) (0.0544) (0.0855) (0.0618)
4 sets previous match male 0.0604 0.0567 -0.0829 0.0745 -0.101 0.137 0.0137
(0.200) (0.0888) (0.0803) (0.0602) (0.0655) (0.0915) (0.0677)
5 sets previous match male 0.187 -0.124 0.000690 0.104 -0.0775 0.252** -0.0419
(0.217) (0.138) (0.0969) (0.0733) (0.0713) (0.0965) (0.0817)
2 sets previous match female -0.0624 -0.0438 -0.110 0.0655 -0.0614 0.0105 0.0235
(0.188) (0.117) (0.0900) (0.0776) (0.0785) (0.114) (0.0953)
3 sets previous match female -0.333* -0.120 0.0293 -0.0158 -0.0549 0.183* -0.0288
(0.140) (0.0981) (0.0741) (0.0639) (0.0655) (0.0888) (0.0892)
Female 0.247* 0.0192 -0.103 0.0507 -0.0788 -0.0367 -0.00830
(0.117) (0.0675) (0.0583) (0.0458) (0.0451) (0.0676) (0.0627)
Home Advantage -0.122 -0.0147 0.0865 -0.00253 0.0120 -0.0802 -0.125
(0.157) (0.0827) (0.0746) (0.0535) (0.0552) (0.0847) (0.0665)
FE Tournament Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant 0.541*** 0.615*** 0.566*** 0.538*** 0.541*** 0.578*** 0.458***
(0.119) (0.0644) (0.0514) (0.0398) (0.0394) (0.0625) (0.0501)
Observations 123 411 606 1,001 985 450 692
R-squared 0.203 0.037 0.048 0.009 0.018 0.047 0.027
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Figure 1
DISCUSSION
Table 3 analyzes di↵erent rounds with the binary approach. We observe that
players have momentum, with a 54.2% chance to win the last set (assuming
all control variables are ”0”). In the introduction of the paper we explained
how momentum was introduced in basketball. In basketball, researchers use
the ”hot hand” as a synonym for momentum. This means that a player has
a high probability to make the consecutive shots he takes. The definition
includes the concept that a player benefits from momentum even though he
does not hit every shot.
The concept of momentum is misinterpreted in tennis when using the
binary approach. Winning a set in tennis has di↵erent meanings depending
on the winning score (7 - 6 or 6 - 0). An opponent constantly challenged
a player if a set is won through e.g. a tie break (thus, winning 7 - 6) or
in overtime (viz. (7 - 5). It can be the case, that after winning a game
the opponent directly countered the player. Thus, winning a set in such a
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situation only results in a benefit for the match but it does not give the player
momentum. Momentum is applicable only when players benefit from a clear
advantage.
The intuition from Table 3 is straightforward. Players have a 4.2% higher
chance to win the last set than their opponents. These results change com-
pletely when we include the set score in Table 4. We observe a considerably
higher momentum for every set score except for 7 - 6.
When a player wins the second to last set in tie break (winning 7 - 6)
he has a significantly lower chance to win the last set than his opponent.
Therefore, a player has anti-momentum after winning a set in tie break. One
explanation for this counterintuitive result is that players need control over
a match to succeed. Without controlling a match, players are not able to
influence the match in their desired direction. Our results support the control
theory (Rotter, 1966). Control theory states ” . . . one should expect to
succeed to the extent that one feels in control of one’s successes and failures.”
(Eccles & Wigfield, 2002, p.111) A player evaluates a tie-breaking win (7 -
6) as a negative outcome. Beating another player in a tie-breaker is the
closest possible margin to win a set. Although the player wins the second
to the last set, the player loses control over the match. Thus, a player is
disappointed that he beat his opponent only in a tie-breaker and not with
a higher margin. This loss of control leads to a loss in the player’s success
perception; the player has anti-momentum.
We do not find any empirical support for including the variable rounds.
No round shows a significant advantage or disadvantage for a player. While
including rounds makes sense from a theoretical perspective, we do not ob-
serve any statistical significance or pattern. However, the same pattern is
visible for both home advantage and the gender of the player. Thus, the
variable could still have an influence in future research.
CONCLUSION
We examine in this paper whether tennis players benefit from momentum.
First, we analyze our data with the classical binary approach. We find mo-
mentum for players; however, we think that set scores are decisive factors
when evaluating a match. Thus, limiting a set outcome to win or lose unnec-
essarily narrows the dataset. Second, we include set scores and tournament
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rounds to analyze the data. We do not find any significant e↵ects for the
di↵erent tournament rounds. However, the set score approach, in contrast to
the binary approach, shows a strong momentum for every set-score except
for a tie break.
Nonetheless, our analysis is far from complete. Future research could
incorporate whether player characteristics (e.g. age, handedness, or e↵ect
of a wild card) influence the results of this paper or influence momentum.
In an ideal dataset we would be able to include the results of all sets in a
match. This follows the intuition that the outcome of every set is important
to assess momentum. We measure tiredness by the amount of sets played
in the previous match in the same tournament. A more complete measure
could incorporate how many tournaments a player attended in a specific time
period. Additionally, an analysis in combination with the betting market
could observe if bettors exploit knowledge regarding the set scores or if this
information is included in already the odds.
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We empirically compare the performance of female and male team
managers. We find that female team managers never perform
worse than male team managers. Additionally, we find that spe-
cialized experience has no influence. Specialized experience means
having worked previously as an employee in the same industry.
Our dataset consists of female and male managers in the German
women soccer leagues and the North American women basketball
league. Managers in team sports usually have exactly the same
tasks (selection, coordination, and motivation of team members)
as team managers in other industries. Our results provide impor-
tant implications for industries, companies, and clubs who oppose
employing female team managers.
INTRODUCTION
In most industries, companies employ teams to perform tasks. For example
R&D teams create and develop new products and services, marketing teams
are responsible for selling new and existing products, and production teams
optimize plant operations. These teams consist of several team members and
a team manager. The team manager in a business environment is respon-
sible, to some extent, for the sta↵ (e.g., hiring and laying o↵ employees),
communication (e.g., managing goals and mission of a team), and training
(e.g., improving the employees skill set).
In our analysis we define sports coaches as team managers and players as
team members. A team manager in sports is, similar to team managers in
other industries, responsible for the performance of the team. The selection,
supervision, and training of team members, as well as devising tactics and
communicating with media define the remit of team sports managers (God-
dard & Sloane, 2014). As the responsibilities of managers and team leaders
are similar, numerous authors make this connection (Marsh, 1992; Clark,
1999; Ladyshewsky, 2010).
The representation of female team managers in European professional
sports leagues (Hovden, 2013) or North American intercollegiate sports (Acosta
& Carpenter, 2014) is very limited. Some European women soccer leagues,
the North American basketball WNBA and the tennis Fed Cup and Hopman
Cup are examples of sports competitions employing a significant number of
female team managers. We examine if this limited representation is sim-
ply due to di↵erences in performance and whether professional clubs employ
fewer female managers because they simply perform worse.
We compare the performance of women team managers with men team
managers in the North American women basketball league (WNBA) and the
three top European women soccer leagues (France, Germany, and Norway).
This dataset allows us to avoid most of the shortcomings that papers ana-
lyzing the performance of female and male team managers report.
Team managers in these leagues have very di↵erent characteristics: In the
WNBA we compare female and male managers who were professional play-
ers previously in their careers. Thus, all coaches in the WNBA have specific
experience in their work environment, i.e., all managers worked as employees
in the same industry (see Figure 1). The right side of Figure 1 shows that
approximately 80% of managers with professional player experience are male
in the WNBA. In the European case we compare female coaches with experi-
ence as professional players with male coaches without this experience. Male
managers with experience as professional players do not work in women’s
soccer leagues. Most of them are employed as managers for male teams.
The left side of Figure 1 shows that 0% of managers with professional player
experience are male in the European leagues in our study. In the WNBA a
significant number of both male and female coaches have professional expe-
rience as players. We therefore have two case studies: WNBA and European
soccer leagues.
Our study contributes an accurate measure of performance to the existing
literature on gender di↵erences between female and male team managers.
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Our dataset also allows us to measure the skill set of the team members,
which is sometimes impossible in other sectors, and include the specialized
experience of managers. In addition, we are able to compare team managers
within the same sector and avoid biases that may appear when comparing
teams performing in di↵erent sectors. Finally, our empirical analysis allows
us to argue that the under-representation of female team managers in this
context is not due to performance di↵erences.
Figure 1 - Managers with specialized experienced.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Leading and managing teams is an important task in order to be successful.
Therefore, a substantial amount of research on the di↵erent aspects of team
management exists. Several authors examine team management to improve
surgical procedures (Crysdale et al., 2006; Friedland et al., 2011; Stephens
et al., 2006), to increase revenue in large corporations (Erhardt et al., 2003;
Deszo¨ & Ross, 2008; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), or to improve the performance
of nongovernmental organizations (Korten, 1987; Lindenberg, 2001; Smillie
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and Hailey, 2001). This is a brief compendium of the extensive literature
analyzing team management.
Many of the studies that analyze di↵erences between female and male
team managers have shortcomings when measuring the performance: First,
researchers use the stock market to analyze companies’ performance across
di↵erent sectors. These analysis have the drawback that the whole company
represents one team. It is unreasonable to assume that a team manager’s
performance is visible for a team consisting of a very large number of team
members. Also, the authors base their theoretic work on the e cient market
hypothesis which has been criticized by numerous authors (Basu, 1977; Fama,
1998; Shiller, 2000). For other areas (e.g., medicine or NGO’s), it is equally
di cult to measure team performance.
Second, many studies face di culties when assessing the talent and skills
of individual team members (e.g., surgeons, or employees in NGO’s), which
have an important influence on teams’ performance. Most ignore these prob-
lems by omitting individual performance.
Third, most authors neglect or do not specify the experience of team man-
agers. Tesluk and Jacobs (1998) argue that the specification of the experience
source is important because the context in which experience is gained might
have an influence on performance. Several researchers examine that the ed-
ucation of team managers significantly correlates with the outcome of teams
and companies.
Finally, several authors compare companies or teams from di↵erent sec-
tors or industries (e.g., Kalleberg & Leicht, 1991; Erhardt, Werbel, & Schrader,
2003; Wolfers, 2006; Elsaid & Ursel, 2011; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Post & By-
ron, 2015). However, the economic or general conditions for teams di↵er
significantly from sector to sector. For example, while most sectors have to
cope with a significant loss of demand during an economic downturn, many
companies have unchanged or increased demand for their products (Dave &
Kelly, 2012; Smith, Ng, & Popkin, 2014). Another example is surgery. The
success (and thus performance) rate of a team of cardiothoracic surgeons is
generally di↵erent than the success of a team of trauma and orthopaedic
surgeons. Therefore, it is important to compare teams in the same sector.
The sports industry, which is under-examined in the team management
literature, provides us with an ideal scenario for four reasons: First, we have
an exact measurement of team performance - points per game. This variable
is important because it determines the success of team managers. Points per
game in a league defines the success of teams.
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Second, we have su cient information to measure the skill set of team
members. In other contexts, it is di cult to measure the skill set of team
members. Nonetheless, the team members play an important part in the final
performance. In our data we distinguish between high- and low-ranked na-
tional players, players receiving individual performance awards, and players
skills when they join a team.
Third, we compare teams in the same sector. Teams competing in the
same league face the same opponents and work under similar conditions.
Thus, the use of sports data allows us to avoid comparisons between compa-
nies in di↵erent sectors.
Finally, we examine and specify the previous experience of team man-
agers in the sports industry. We know if managers were professional players
previously in their career. This is valuable experience for managers as they
had to compete in a similar professional environment. During their time as
professional players, managers receive specialized experience in for example,
technical or physical training. This is a valuable asset for future managers
in sports. Gaining experience as a professional player in sports is similar to
receiving specialized education and training in other industries. Addition-
ally, for the WNBA data we know how many years managers worked in the
sports industry.
Many researchers examine the under-representation of female team coaches
(Bracken, 2009; Walker & Bopp, 2011 ). Furthermore, the lack of role mod-
els (Avery, Tonidandel, & Philips, 2008), gender stereotypes (Burton, Barr,
Fink, & Bruening, 2009), or self-e cacy issues (Cunningham, Dohert, &
Gregg, 2007) are often identified as obstructions for females.
However, no research examined if women team managers underperform
when compared to male team managers under similar conditions in the same
sector. Negative reactions and attitudes towards women in management
positions are rational only if evidence exists supporting the notion that female
team managers underperform when compared to their male counterparts. As
team managers in sports and other industries share similar responsibilities
(e.g., selection, supervision, coordination, motivation of team members), our
results provide new evidence regarding gender di↵erences in performance.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Several researchers examine performance di↵erences for male and female
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managers. Kalleberg and Leicht (1991) observe gender di↵erences for small
business holders. They analyze companies in various sectors (viz., health,
computer sales, computer software, food and drink) and find no performance
di↵erence between men and women. Wolfers (2006) observes diversity for
S&P 1500 companies. He finds no significant di↵erence in performance be-
tween teams with either a male or a female CEO. Deszo¨ and Ross (2008)
examine CEOs and find no positive correlation between performance and
female managers. Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) study the influence of
women in team management positions for 2500 companies from the Danish
stock market. They find a positive correlation between companies’ perfor-
mance and women in team management positions. Post and Byron (2015)
perform a meta analysis of numerous studies regarding female participation
in the board of directors. They show a positive relation between diversity in
the board and accounting returns.
All previously mentioned papers use financial outcomes (e.g., Tobin’s Q)
to assess the performance of female and male managers. However, these
measures are influenced by many other factors and cannot completely in-
corporate the managerial influence (Kulik & Metz, 2015). In our study, the
sports dataset allows us to include a performance measure (i.e., game victo-
ries) that is more associated with managerial decisions.
The literature highlights that female managers act di↵erently than their
male counterparts and possess unique perspectives that influence group op-
erations (Kulik & Metz, 2015). Moreover, Stoker, Van der Velde, and Lam-
mers (2012) find that female employees have a stronger preference for women
in management positions, which also influence the performance of a team.
However, the positive influence of these unique characteristics on final perfor-
mance outcomes is not obvious in the literature. As described in the previous
section, researchers find ambiguous results. Although it is argued that orga-
nizational outcomes (e.g., social responsibility, internal group processes, or
determined management practices) could be improved with females in man-
agement positions (Kulik & Metz, 2015), the final outcome might not di↵er
much. Researchers consider, in general, females’ transformational manage-
ment style to be e↵ective in most organizations nowadays. This e↵ect could
be diminished in a sports organization. For example, senior female players
whose opinions weigh heavily on teams’ decision processes and strategies can
provide teams with the unique ”female” perspective. The combination of
female senior players and male coaches is an heterogeneous group that could
work similarly to a mixed directory board. Therefore, we cannot assume that
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the gender of the manager is per se an advantage for teams or organizations:
Hypothesis 1: Female and male managers do not outperform each other.
Leadership styles of female managers may not result in significantly better
final outcomes compared with male managers. However, the glass cli↵ lit-
erature shows how female managers are often appointed in more risky and
precarious positions (Ryan & Haslam, 2005). The reason why the glass cli↵
persists is that female managers are perceived by owners as having the neces-
sary skills to cope with di cult situations and being more risk averse (Kulik
& Metz, 2015). For instance, Elsaid and Ursel (2011) and Khan and Vieito
(2013) use the S&P 1500 to compare the e↵ect of female and male managers
on companies’ risk levels. Both studies find that female managers are more
risk averse than their male counterparts. Thus, the comparison between fe-
male and male managers in companies might be biased as women often have
to achieve similar results in more challenging situations.
We contribute to this literature by analyzing the preconditions of team
managers in their workplace (i.e., quality of players available, previous per-
formance of the team and other contextual factors). We show that the glass
cli↵ phenomenon also plays a role in sports organizations. Because of sports
cycles (i.e., senior players retirements, financial crisis, losses of sponsors etc.),
teams end up in di cult situations where inexperienced or low profile play-
ers have to outperform. In such a scenario, it is likely that, just like in
any other organization, owners prefer to hire female managers who are more
risk averse. Moreover, women are seen as capable of providing teams with
communication channels (Melero, 2011) and a more democratic and partic-
ipative spirit (Dezso¨ & Ross, 2012), which is determinant in the absence of
high profile team members. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Female team managers work under worse preconditions than
their male counterparts.
The positive e↵ect of the education of managers on the performance of teams
is generally accepted in the literature. Jalbert, Rao, and Jalbert (2002) show
that return on assets for large companies in the US depends on the educa-
tion of managers. Bhagat, Bolton, and Subramanian (2010) find a positive
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short-term relationship between highly educated managers and firms’ perfor-
mance. However, conceptual education programs often fail to promote the
development of practical skills that are required for managers later on in the
labor market.
In sports organizations, the federations require professional managers to
obtain a specific licence/certification that permits them to train professional
teams. Thus, to obtain this certification managers need to enroll in specific
courses that integrate both practical and theoretical sport-specific knowl-
edge. We believe the education and experience levels of managers become
less important when specific training is required to access the job.
Human Capital and Learning theories suggest that job experience should
improve performance levels as employees incorporate specific-knowledge and
develop skills and abilities (Sturman, 2003). Thus, active senior team mem-
bers can reduce the impact that managers with specialized experienced (i.e.,
managers who have been former professional player) might have on teams’
performance. For instance, active senior team members can provide teams
and managers with an experienced and unique perspective fruits of their
participation in the competition. Thus, male and female managers with no
specialized experience (i.e., managers without experience as professional play-
ers) can use the experience of their active players to improve the performance
of the teams. We believe that managers education and specialized experi-
ence are not crucial variables in organizations with senior active members
and specific training requirements. We, therefore, formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Team managers with specialized experience do not perform
better than other team managers.
In the following section we describe and analyze our data. We then present
two studies from professional women sports competitions (basketball and
soccer) to test our hypotheses. Afterwards, we discuss our results and finish
with a concise conclusion.
STUDY 1 - NORTH AMERICAN BASKETBALL LEAGUE
In Study 1, we examine the WNBA. This league is unique because most
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female and male managers were previously professional players. Clubs in
the WNBA have consistently employed female managers. In the 2015-2016
season 5 of 12 managers are women. Women managers have worked in the
WNBA since, and Mary Murphy).
Basketball is a team sport in which two teams of five players each try
to score more points (getting the ball through an elevated hoop) than the
opponent team. A basket is worth two points (three points if made outside of
the three-point arc and one point if it is a free throw). Games consist of four
periods of ten minutes with a two-minute break between each quarter. The
win is for the team achieving the highest number of points.1 The focus of
study 1 is to analyze managers with similar experience. For male managers,
we define specialized experience as having played in the national basketball
association (NBA). For female managers, we define specialized experience
as having participated in either the WNBA or one of its predecessors.2 All
managers in this analysis have previously worked as employees in the same
industry and therefore have gained specialized experience.
This employment gives managers the possibility to benefit from techni-
cal or physical training, for example. Several authors examine that team
managers’ education significantly correlates with the outcome of teams and
companies. Jalbert et al. (2002) show that return on assets for large compa-
nies in the US depends on the education of managers. Bhagat et al. (2010)
find a positive correlation between highly educated managers and the per-
formance of firms in the short-term. We therefore include whether or not
managers have specialized experience. In addition to the specialized experi-
ence we know how many years of experience the WNBA managers have.
The WNBA is one of very few leagues where female manager are active
(Acosta & Carpenter, 2014; Kampho↵, 2010; Thorngren, 1990). No other
league yields such a consistent data set for male and female managers. How-
ever, as the WNBA is a relatively new league, our data is restricted to the
time-period 2000-2015. The WNBA is an attractive workplace for male and
female managers. Several managers have worked in both the male and female
leagues.3
Study 1 - Data
1For additional information regarding basketball rules see WNBA (2014).
2The WNBA only exists in its present form since 2000.
3Coaches who worked in both leagues are, e.g., Michael Cooper and Paul Westhead.
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Table 1 provides an overview of the data we use in Study 1. All data is
publicly available at basketball-reference.com.
Variables
As a primary outcome variable for performance we choose if a team wins
a game Game result. This is the most complete measurement available to
approach teams’ success; it is comparable to companies’ performance. Sev-
eral authors identify points per game as the focal point for professional team
sports clubs (e.g., Vrooman, 1995; Ke´senne, 1996; Dietl, Lang, & Werner,
2009). Thus, using the winning percentage after every game is an approxi-
mation for points per game.4
To account for teams’ budgets we include game attendance, people living
in a close area, and playing talent. We include Attendance to measure the
average number of people attending a home game in a season. As this number
might be restricted by the people living close to a club, we also control for the
total population who has the possibility to attend a game in a 20 mile radius
(cf. Buraimo & Simmons, 2009; Forrest, Simmons, & Feehan, 2002). Game
attendance is an important source of revenue for clubs because supporters
pay an entrance fee. We summarize game attendance and people living close
by in Club Controls. Because the league is divided in two conferences (eastern
and western) we add a variable to capture their potential influence.
In several models for professional team sports leagues, playing talent is
the most important expenditure for the budget of a team (Dietl et al., 2009;
Madden, 2011). Therefore, our aim is to clearly di↵erentiate between the
players in a league to measure their skill set.
To evaluate playing talent we use Allstars and MVP. The variable All-
stars consists of players who are voted into an Allstar team. The variable
MVP includes players who have been a MVP in one of several categories,
i.e., Defensive Player of the Year, Rookie of the Year, Finals Most Valuable
Player, or Season MVP. For these variables (Allstar and MVP), players are
evaluated based on their performance.
To compare the incoming playing talent in a team, we examine the draft.
In a draft, players who enter a league for the first time are ranked according to
their skills and previous performance. Thus, a higher ranked draft position
4It is also appropriate to use the position before/after the playo↵s. However, the results
in the analysis do not di↵er significantly when using either of these methods.
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should represent a higher playing talent. As the league has several draft
rounds and teams have several choices, we distinguish between the first,
second, and third draft round and the first and second teams’ pick.
We include age, experience, education, race, and gender of the managers.
We clearly di↵erentiate between experience as a manager (captured in the
variable experience) and specialized experience as a player. Specialized expe-
rience means that the manager worked as an employee in the same industry.
Furthermore, we di↵erentiate between three di↵erent education levels; no
college degree, undergraduate degree, graduate degree. Last, we include the
race of the manager. We only distinguish between African American and
White American5 managers. Every manager who coached a team for at least
half of the games in one season is included in our analysis.
Study 1 - Analysis and Results
In Table 2 we perform a regression with robust standard errors.6 Our depen-
dent variable is a 1 if a team wins a game and 0 if a team losses a game.
To account for the draft picks we include the first round.7
Other measures to correct for teams’ budget are MVP, Allstars, attendance,
and population in 20-mile radius. For managers’ characteristics we add age,
experience, race, education, and gender. In the first regression only age and
experience of the manager are included. Additionally, we include year fixed
e↵ects. We then stepwise include the other variables to show their impact.
We find that almost no variable, that we use to assess teams’ budget
is statistically significant except for playing a game at home. While hav-
ing an Allstar has a positive e↵ect on the winning probability other e↵ects
have only a negligible impact (e.g., age and experience of the manager). No
performance di↵erences exist between female and male managers.
To further analyze the data we examine the di↵erent preconditions of fe-
male and male managers using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Table 4).
To evaluate gender or group di↵erences (e.g., between rich and poor citizens)
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is frequently used in labor economics (e.g.,
5O cial terminology from the US Census Bureau.
6A logit/probit model is also appropriate. However, it does not yield statistically
significant results.
7Including another draft round (2nd and 3rd pick) has no statistical significance.
53
T
ab
le
2:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
W
N
B
A
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
F
em
al
e
m
an
ag
er
-0
.0
06
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
-0
.0
00
0.
01
1
0.
01
5
0.
01
5
0.
01
8
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
16
)
A
ge
of
m
an
ag
er
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
E
xp
er
ie
n
ce
of
m
an
ag
er
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
2*
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
H
om
e
ga
m
e
-0
.6
16
**
*
-0
.6
16
**
*
-0
.6
16
**
*
-0
.6
16
**
*
-0
.6
16
**
*
-0
.6
16
**
*
-0
.6
16
**
*
-0
.6
16
**
*
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
10
)
M
V
P
0.
02
1*
0.
02
2*
0.
02
3*
0.
02
6*
*
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
09
)
A
ll
st
ar
s
0.
04
2*
**
0.
04
0*
**
0.
04
1*
**
0.
03
9*
**
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
07
)
D
ra
ft
1s
t
P
ic
k
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
07
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
13
)
D
ra
ft
2n
d
P
ic
k
-0
.0
04
**
-0
.0
04
**
-0
.0
04
**
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
02
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
F
E
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
R
ac
e
F
E
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
C
on
fe
re
n
ce
F
E
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
C
lu
b
co
nt
ro
ls
Y
Y
Y
ea
r
F
E
Y
C
on
st
an
t
0.
61
4*
**
0.
62
4*
**
0.
63
1*
**
0.
63
3*
**
0.
57
4*
**
0.
59
4*
**
0.
61
4*
**
0.
58
7*
**
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
56
)
(0
.0
58
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
4,
88
3
4,
88
3
4,
88
3
4,
88
3
4,
88
3
4,
88
3
4,
88
3
4,
88
3
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
0.
44
7
0.
44
8
0.
44
8
0.
44
8
0.
45
5
0.
45
6
0.
45
6
0.
45
8
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
**
*
p
<
0.
00
1,
**
p
<
0.
01
,
*
p
<
0.
05
54
Stanley & Jarrell, 1998; Weichselbaumer &Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Yun & Yun,
2004). The decomposition divides the performance di↵erences between male
and female managers in unexplained and explained variation. The di↵er-
ences are explained with the explanatory variables. Practically speaking this
means that we compare two groups and evaluate if they have di↵erent pre-
conditions which influence their performance. Accordingly, in our case we
examine if females and males have di↵erent/similar performance because of
di↵erent/similar preconditions.8
Table 3: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
WNBA.
VARIABLES
Males .305⇤⇤⇤
(.007)
Females .284⇤⇤⇤
(.014)
Explained .014
(.010)
Unexplained .006
(.019)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 yields several interesting results.9 We see that the performance be-
tween males and females is very similar. Additionally, we find that although
female managers have worse preconditions they are negligible small in our
8A propensity score matching approach is also appropriate (for a more detailed dis-
cussion regarding the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and propensity score matching see
Kline (2011).)
9We omit all non-significant e↵ects, as the analysis is otherwise too extensive.
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analysis.
Study 1 - Discussion
In study 1 we compare female and male managers who were professional
players in their previous career. We find support for Hypothesis 1 because
neither female nor male managers significantly outperform each other in the
WNBA. In any case, female managers do not perform worse than male man-
agers as the samll number of coaches may suggest.
Our results do not confirm Hypothesis 2. We do not find that female man-
agers in the WNBA work under significantly worse preconditions, as the
glass cli↵ literature has previously found in other industries. Otherwise, the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition would show di↵erences in the covariates. Ad-
ditionally, because of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the WNBA we need
Study 2 to further test this hypothesis.
In contrast to many women soccer leagues, where the manager compen-
sation is rather low (e.g., Germany), many male managers see the WNBA
as an attractive workplace. Thus, both male and female managers have sim-
ilar levels of experience (i.e., both have been former professional players).
However, in order to prove Hypothesis 3 we must examine if specialized ex-
perience influences the managers’ performance. Therefore, in the next study
we examine if the performance di↵erence is the same when male and some
female managers have less specialized experience.
STUDY 2: EUROPEAN SOCCER LEAGUES
In Study 2 we examine three top European women soccer leagues.10
Women managers frequently have worked in these leagues in the early 2000’s.
In all three leagues, the percentage of women managers has sharply declined
since 2008: France 27% in 2008 to 9% in 2014, Germany 33% in 2008 to 8%
in 2014, and Norway 36% in 2008 to 18% in 2014.
Soccer is a team sport in which two teams with 11 players try to score more
goals (getting the ball into the opposing goal) than the opponent to win the
game. Games consist of 90 minutes (2 periods of 45 minutes) with a 15-
minute half-time break. A soccer team receives three points for a win, one
10The leagues in France, Germany, and Norway are three of the five largest women
soccer leagues in Europe with respect to total budget for women’s soccer (UEFA, 2014).
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for a draw, and zero for a loss.11 These leagues are ideal because a significant
amount of data is publicly available (for France since 2004 and for Germany
and Norway since 2000). We use these leagues to explore if females with
and without specialized experience (i.e., being former professional players)
perform di↵erently compared to males without specialized experience.
Study 2 - Data
Our data comes from various sources. For league statistics (i.e., rank, name,
and age of the team manager; player of the year; and game attendance) we use
data from transfermarkt.com (authors using the same source are e.g., Hard-
man & Iorwerth, 2014; Lee, Jang, & Hwang, 2014; Parsons & Rohde, 2015).
For older data many observations about name and age of the manager were
missing. Therefore, we contacted the soccer clubs or the appropriate federa-
tion directly. We had to omit approximately 0.5% of the data because either
the gender or the age of the manager was unclear or untraceable. Unfortu-
nately, no reliable information about the management experience was avail-
able. We use the Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
for data about aggregate team information (national team ranking). All the
above mentioned variables are shown in Table 4.
Variables
The performance of a club is normally assessed by a team’s position in the
league. The position depends on the points that a team makes throughout
a season. Thus, comparable to the WNBA case, we use the Game result as
a dependent variable. That is, a team receives 3 points for a win, 1 for a tie,
and 0 for a loss.
Additionally, we again control for the following variables: age and gender
of the manager, attendance at a home game, and people who have the possibil-
ity to attend a game in a 10 mile radius. We decrease the radius from Study
1 by 10 miles, as US customers are more willing to travel a longer distance
than European customers (Pucher, 1988; Pucher & Lefever, 1996; Giuliano
& Narayan, 2003).12 Again, we suppress attendance and people living close
by in a club control variable.
11For additional information regarding soccer rules see FIFA (2015).
12Changing the radius has no statistically significant impact on the results.
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Unfortunately, two variables from the previous case are not available;
experience as a team manager and education. We choose not to include race
because fewer than 1% are not white.
Naturally, national team managers try to choose the best players for their
teams. Accordingly, we distinguish between players who play for a national
team and those who do not. We use the FIFA national ranking to detect if
players are playing for a high- or low-ranked national team. In this ranking
the performance of a national team is evaluated and compared with all other
national teams. To clearly assess the number and skills of international
players, we divide the FIFA ranking into four categories and identify the
number of players in a team playing in these FIFA ranking categories. Thus,
we introduce the variables national players from Top 10, Top 11-20, Top
21-30 and Top 31-200 FIFA ranked nations.
To further assess the skill set of players we observe if a player is voted as
the best player of the year. This variable is useful to detect playing talent
which might not be visible in the FIFA ranking.
For managers we define specialized experience as having played in the
highest soccer league (being closest to a professional career). Thus, we have
three groups: males and females without specialized experience and females
with specialized experience.
Study 2 - Analysis and Results
In Table 5 we show the results of the regression with robust standard errors.
Our dependent variable is the game result. We include country and year
fixed e↵ects. We cluster our results at the country level.
We use the variables game attendance, player of the year, and national
players. We add control variables step by step to show their influence on the
performance of managers. In the second regression we add all player skills
variables. Including them one at a time makes no sense and has no e↵ect on
the significance. In the third regression we add club characteristics and in
the fourth regression we include league fixed e↵ects and in the last regression
we include year fixed e↵ects.
Table 6 shows several results which are less important for our paper.
Playing talent (viz., national players and player of the year) has a significant
diminishing positive e↵ect on rank. Additionally, as in the WNBA study,
playing at home has a significant positive e↵ect.
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Table 5: Regression European Soccer Leagues.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Female manager
Male manager 0.020 0.087 0.080 0.113 0.118
(0.151) (0.103) (0.110) (0.088) (0.094)
Female manager 0.166 0.171 0.177 0.205 0.203
with specialized experience (0.127) (0.136) (0.157) (0.140) (0.145)
Age of manager 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Home game 0.216* 0.219* 0.219* 0.219* 0.219*
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Player of the year 0.245** 0.186** 0.167* 0.162*
(0.018) (0.013) (0.039) (0.043)
National players Top 10
FIFA ranked nation 0.119** 0.114** 0.113** 0.119**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
National players Top 11-20
FIFA ranked nation 0.098** 0.081* 0.089* 0.089**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
National players Top 21-30
FIFA ranked nation 0.061* 0.051* 0.062* 0.052*
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.006)
National players Top 31-200
FIFA ranked nation 0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016
(0.028) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008)
Club contols Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y
League FE Y
Constant 0.658 0.224 0.302 0.326 0.403
(0.244) (0.198) (0.186) (0.142) (0.212)
Observations 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302
R-squared 0.015 0.179 0.182 0.185 0.185
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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However, for this analysis the most important result from Table 5 is the
e↵ect that managers have on performance. We find no di↵erence between
females without specialized experience, females with specialized experience,
and males.
Although the results from Table 6 are straightforward, we want to see if no
performance di↵erences exist because male or female managers have superior
preconditions at their clubs (e.g., they have more national players at their
disposal). Thus, we examine the di↵erences between male and female man-
agers with specialized experience using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in
Table 6. We use the fourth regression as it includes all control variables.
Table 6: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
European Soccer Leagues.
VARIABLES
Males 1.458⇤⇤⇤
(.015)
Females 1.529⇤⇤⇤
with specialized experience (.037)
Explained 0.042⇤
(.018)
Unexplained -0.104⇤⇤
(.038)
Attendance .020⇤⇤⇤
(.001)
Age .036⇤⇤⇤
(.001)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 6 shows a short extract of the decomposition.13 We see that the
13We omit all insignificant e↵ects as the analysis is otherwise too extensive.
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largest part of the di↵erences between females and males is unexplained. The
performance di↵erence between female with specialized experience and males
is about 0.07 points per game. The explained part is due to the attendance
figures and age of the manager. This means that females have less visitors
at their games and are younger.
Study 2 - Discussion
In study 2 we compare female managers, who were professional players in
their previous career, with male and female managers who were not pro-
fessional players. The results show that neither female managers nor male
and female managers without comparable experience outperform each other.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 finds empirical support because female and male
managers do not outperform each other. Additionally, the results support
Hypothesis 3 as managers, in general, with more experience do not perform
better than those without such experience.
Gottesman and Morey (2006) observe the connection between mutual
fund performance and managers’ education (for a similar study regarding
Chinese companies see Huang, Yang, Xie, & Li, 2013). They find a positive
relationship. Darmadi (2013) examines the correlation between companies
performance, and the education of the board members. They also find a
positive connection. Our findings show a di↵erent path. We find that ex-
perience (education) has no impact on the performance of teams possibly
due to the specific coaching training requirements and the presence of senior
active team members.
Regarding the preconditions women and men encounter when managing
their teams, we find support for Hypothesis 2. Female managers work under
significantly worse preconditions than male managers, which coincides with
previous findings in the glass cli↵ literature. Although the largest part of the
di↵erence is unexplained, our analyses show female managers having lower
attendance figures and being younger.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous researchers focus on analyzing di↵erences in performance when a
company has a woman in a management position. Many researchers use
the stock market to compare companies in several sectors. In most sectors,
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demand and labor fluctuation are divergent, which makes it considerably
di cult to use the stock market as a reference point across sectors. Our
study is independent of the stock market.
We examine how female and male team managers influence the perfor-
mance of teams in the same sector. All clubs are equally a↵ected by de-
mand and labor variations. For that purpose, we conduct two studies with
data from professional women sports leagues. Study 1 analyzes the North
American women’s basketball league, in which both female and male team
managers have similar experience. Study 2 focuses on European women soc-
cer leagues, where some females have specialized experience and male team
managers and other female managers have no specialized experience. Both
studies allow us to test not only whether female or male team managers per-
form better, but also the e↵ect that the experience of team managers have
on the performance of teams.
The results from the European case support the hypothesis that female
team managers and male managers perform equally well. Therefore, we can-
not reject Hypothesis 1. Although we find that that females work under
worse preconditions in the European case we find no support that females
have di↵erent preconditions in the WNBA. We therefore reject Hypothesis
2. Additionally, Hypothesis 3 finds empirical support as managers with spe-
cialized experience do not perform better than other managers in our studies.
Implications for Research
Our research provides new empirical evidence regarding gender di↵erences
in performance between team managers. The results show no di↵erence in
performance between teams with experienced male or female team managers.
Similar results were found in previous studies that focus on females in CEO
positions (Dezso¨ & Ross, 2008; Wolfers, 2006). Additionally, the European
soccer case demonstrates that specialized experience has no e↵ect. These re-
sults reject the notion that a positive correlation exists between women with
specialized experience in management positions and performance (Smith et
al., 2006).
Unlike other researchers studying the e↵ect of gender on team perfor-
mance (e.g., Erhardt et al., 2003; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Wolfers, 2006), our
study focuses on teams in the same sector, thus, avoiding seasonal demand
issues that appear when comparing multiple sectors.
Many researchers have been criticized for focusing on the e cient market
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hypothesis (e.g., Fama, 1998; Shiller, 2000). We use a dependent variable
that allows us to accurately measure team performance. The use of ranking
provides a specific and widely accepted benchmark to assess the performance
of teams and the managerial influence.
Additionally, we contribute to the literature by including specialized ex-
perience (i.e., having worked as employee in the same industry). Study 2 re-
sults show that team managers with specialized experience perform as good
as managers with no such experience. These results contrast with previous
findings which report a significant correlation between the education of man-
agers and companies’ profits and performance (Jalbert et al., 2002; Bhagat
et al., 2010).
Soriano and Castrogiovanni (2012) show that managers specific and gen-
eral knowledge in a sector have a positive e↵ect on companies’ performance.
They argue that having worked previously in a similar environment is highly
correlated with productivity. Therefore, it is reasonable to employ team
managers who have previously worked in a similar professional environment.
However, in an industry like sports organizations, where managers often are
required to obtain a license in a highly specific course, the e↵ect of having
or not previous experience could be diminished.
Thus, our results either show that specialized experience has no e↵ect
or that additional experience among highly experienced individuals has no
e↵ect.
Finally, this paper contributes to the glass cli↵ literature by analyzing the
preconditions that female managers have when managing a team in a sport
competition. This literature claims that women are often hired in more risky
positions than their male counterparts (Ryan & Haslam, 2005), in part be-
cause they are perceived as having the managerial skills to outperform in
di cult situations (Kulik & Metz, 2015). However, many of the previously
mentioned studies that compare female and male managers’ performance
(e.g., CEO positions) only use lagged values of companies performance to
control for the female e↵ect. Thus, teams’ preconditions are often not in-
cluded in the analyses (e.g., di↵erent financial situations, less team talent or
resources available).
In our study, we are able to examine whether the di↵erences in perfor-
mance between female and male managers are due to di↵erent preconditions
that might influence the final outcome (e.g., more talented players in the
team, higher attendance figures, more population living in a close area etc.).
The WNBA and the European soccer leagues show di↵erent results. While
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the former does not present significant di↵erences between female and male
managers the latter shows how females are younger and coach teams with
lower attendance. Due to this disparity, we cannot conclude that the glass
cli↵ phenomenon is present in all sports organizations. However, we can ar-
gue that female managers do not perform worse than male managers, even
in a setting where they are at a disadvantage (i.e., European leagues). Fu-
ture research on performance di↵erences between female and male managers
should control for potential di↵erent preconditions reported in some indus-
tries.
Practical Implications
Beyond the theoretical contributions mentioned previously, this study also
provides practical implications. Clubs, organizations, and companies should
take these implications into consideration when hiring personnel in team
management positions.
Research shows that women are keen to adopt a more democratic and
participative management style than men in team management positions
(Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Holmes, 2006). A participative management style
is reported to have a positive impact on employees’ satisfaction in both public
and private sectors (Kim, 2002). Stoker, Van der Velde, and Lammers (2012)
find that female employees, employees having previous experience working for
a female team manager, and employees working in companies with a greater
percentage of women in management positions have a stronger preference for
females in management positions.
The negative reactions of owners and decision-makers towards women
in management positions (Lee & James, 2007; Brunzell & Liljeblom, 2012)
might be due to stereotypes rather than evidence. We find no evidence of
females underperforming. Female team managers with specialized experi-
ence working at a younger age and with worse attendance figures (Study 2)
manage to perform as well as males. Therefore, gender diversity in team
management positions might be very valuable for industries, companies, and
clubs. The argument that regulations to ensure diversity (e.g., quotas) lead
to younger and less experienced team managers (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012),
might have a di↵erent insight. In a setting where no quota has been im-
plemented (i.e., sports clubs), we find female managers to be significantly
younger than their male counterparts. This demographic characteristic of fe-
males in management positions has been also found in other industries (Kulik
& Metz, 2015), and according to our study it does not seem to have anything
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to do with the implementation of regulations like quotas.
Our research shows that specialized experience, as previous involvement
in professional environments, has no e↵ect on performance. Other authors
find a positive correlation between companies’ performance and level of ed-
ucation of team managers and board members (Bhagat et al., 2010; Dar-
madim, 2013; Jalbert et al., 2002). Gottesman and Morey (2006) observe
that managers holding MBA degrees in top ranked schools have a better per-
formance than those from unranked programs. However, this evidence is not
obvious in our results. Therefore, companies and organizations might find it
valuable to identify potential di↵erences in previous professional experience
among the candidates especially if no specific training is provided.
Limitations and future research
Our work is severely limited by the number of observations in the analy-
sis. For the European soccer leagues we gathered data over a 15-year period
(2000 - 2015). The dataset for the WNBA is equally small. A larger dataset
would further clarify the results of numerous explanatory variables. Due to
the limited dataset, it is not possible to construct a sensible model with a
longer time lag.
Missing data, especially the age and gender of some managers, exacerbate
the problem of working with a small dataset. Unfortunately, no other soccer
leagues in Europe provide a better dataset since female managers are under-
represented in all other leagues. Additionally, the lack of publicly available
information limits the sample size.
In our analysis all team members have the same gender, i.e., all players
are women. Thus, we have a somewhat distorted view of teams. In many
cases, teams consist of both men and women. Unfortunately, we cannot
incorporate a mixed-teams competition in our analysis.
A more complete dataset would include a better measurement of the
quality of the players (e.g., the budget of the clubs). However, budget is
not available in our study. Although our variables manage to explain part of
the budget, an unknown size of the budget still remains unexplained. Thus,
other explanatory variables have to fill this gap in the future (e.g., value of
machinery and real estate a company holds). Finding a more direct approach
to measure how either a female or a male team manager impacts the perfor-
mance of a company is an interesting question for future research. While we
use a quantitative method to assess performance, future research could use
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a qualitative approach to investigate the influence of team managers’ perfor-
mance on employees (e.g., through extensive surveys). Additionally, female
and male team managers could have a di↵erent impact depending on the size
and composition of teams.
Conclusion
We show in our analysis, with data from professional team sports leagues,
that female team managers in no way underperform when compared to male
team managers. Indeed, females outperform males when they have special-
ized experience. Naturally, our analysis has several shortcomings, which
prevent us to fully generalize our findings.
Nonetheless, we are able to formulate implications. Our results show that
it is crucial to include experience to assess the performance of team managers.
Our findings also provide us with the opportunity to formulate a few
raw practical implications. Our practical implications are mainly directed to
clubs and companies. We show that when hiring a team manager, clubs and
companies should never base their decision only on the gender of a candidate.
Gender per se is not a sensible indicator of performance. Experience in the
same sector is a superior indicator for hiring a candidate.
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